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In Re Madden:
The Threat to the New Journalism
DANIEL A. SWARTWOLr*
In von Bulow v. von Bulow, the Second Circuit, in a widely-adopted
opinion, announced a test for determining who may assert the qualified privilege
protecting journalists from compelled disclosure of confidential sources (in
other words, for determining who qualifies as a journalist). Under this test, a
court must determine whether, at the inception of the newsgathering process, the
individual intended to disseminate information to the public. In a recent case, In
re Madden, the Third Circuit invoked this test in denying standing to the
operator of a 1-900 wrestling hotline. This Case Comment contends that the
Third Circuit's focus on the subject matter and entertaining nature of the 1-900
hotline operator's reports violates the fundamental principles of the First
Amendment, and may threaten the "new journalism, " which combines satire,
muckraking, gossip, and humor with traditional reportng. The author proposes
an analytical framework that advances a broad, functional definition of
'journalism, "focused more exclusively on the intent to disseminate information
before its receipt, and encompassing all vehicles for information and opinion.
This functional definition, the author contends, will foster an environment in
which the fundamental purposes of the First Amendment are fulfilled, and in
which courts need not decide whether a journalist may invoke the privilege
based on the content of his speech.
I. INTRODUCTION
A new style of journalism has emerged from the fragmentation of the
American media consumer. This style, fueled by the need to attract viewers and
readers in an age of overwhelming media choices, combines muckraking, satire,
gossip, and humor with traditional reporting. Newsweek describes the new
journalism this way:
Just the facts won't do anymore. Today's savviest political tone-setters, from
Webheads to columnists, comedians to ideologues, are the ones who use
technology, entertainment, attitude and humor to deliver their take on the
news-and sometimes to make it.... The New News is about cutting through
the clutter, creating new channels for information and, in a lot of cases, getting a
laugh-or a gasp.1
* I wish to thank Tasha Miller and Mary Lynn Swartwout for their support and inspiration
during the Comment-writing process. I also thank Bill Richards, Loretta Heigle, and Joe
Conley for their dedication and patience--especially their patience. Finally, I want to thank to
Mick Foley for making the world a better place for "Mankind.' This Case Comment is
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The new journalism, widely disparaged by "traditional" journalists, might
best be embodied in the form of internet columnist (or, depending on one's point
of view, gossip monger) Matt Drudge. Drudge is a self-taught reporter who
proudly trumpets the fact that he is not a traditional journalist. While many scoff
at his techniques and point with indignation to his sometimes-inaccurate reports,
Drudge has become a major player in the new journalism.2 He became a must-
read when his Drudge Report first broke the Monica Lewinski scandal.3
The new journalism goes beyond Matt Drudge, but critics often point to him
when decrying the downfall of traditional journalism. While his influence may
wane in the future, and his proverbial "fifteen minutes of fame" may draw to a
close, the imprint of the new journalism appears as if it will last long after the
public has forgotten Matt Drudge. Even bastions of traditional journalism have
been inspired to co-opt a more sensational form of reporting.4
Since the Supreme Court's ruling in Branzburg v. Hayes,5 most federal
jurisdictions have afforded journalists a qualified privilege against the compelled
disclosure of sources and information obtained in the newsgathering process.6
I Titans of 'tude, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 18, 1999, at 32, 32. The report features "20 stars of an
em in which wit and fresh venues are changing how Americans get their news." Id.
2 See Michael Godwin, Internet Libel, 8 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 757, 757-58 (1998)
(discussing Drudge's reporting style and a libel suit brought against him); see also Cynthia
Cotts, Wishful Reporting, VILLAGE VOICE, Jan. 19, 1999, at 38 (describing Drudge as someone
who "would gladly downplay accuracy and fairness for entertainment value" when reporting a
story); The Drudge Report: An Internet-Age Walter Winchell Upsets Mainstream Media and
the White House, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Apr. 12, 1998, at GI (describing Drudge as an
eccentric interet gossip working from his apartment).
3 See Godwin, supra note 2, at 757 ("[1]f you read his coverage of the Monica Lewinski
scandal, it's fascinating, fascinating to see how often Drudge has been right.'); 7tans of 'tude,
supra note 1, at 32 (calling Drudge one of the stars of the '"New News").
4 See Joel Brown, '98 In Review: Not A Pretty Picture: Would the President's Denial of
Sexual Relations Be Any Clearer in High-Definition? We l Never Know, ELECTRONIC MEDIA,
Jan. 4, 1999, at 20, 21 (describing CNN's "Operation Tailwind" report about nerve gas use in
Vietnam as "at best unsubstantiated, and at worst completely wrong'). Brown writes: "The
original '60 Minutes' topped that with Dr. Jack Kevorldan providing video of himself Idlling a
guy. Then, at year's end, [60 Minutes producer Don] Hewitt apologized, on air, for showing
part of a bogus British drug-smuggling documentary." Id at 21.
5 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
6 Some type of qualified journalist's privilege has been adopted in all but three federal
circuits. See Kevin J. Baum, Note, The Journalist's Privilege: Ensuring That Compelled
Disclosure Is the Exception, Not the Rule, 3 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L. FORUM 557, 564 n.31
(discussing the federal courts' acceptance of a qualified journalist's privilege following
Branzburg). Because the privilege is not absolute, it can be overcome:
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Because the Supreme Court stated that the notion of the press comprehends
every sort of publication of news and opinion,7 and because the First
Amendment prohibits discrimination against nontraditional journalism,8 most
This test contemplates consideration of a myriad of factors, often uniquely drawn out of
the factual circumstances of the particular case. Each party comes to this test holding a
burden. Initially, the movant must make a prima facie showing that his claim of need and
relevance is not frivolous. Upon such a showing, the burden shifts to the objector to
demonstrate the basis for withholding the information. The court then must place those
factors that relate to the movant's need for the information on one pan of the scales and
those that reflect the objector's interest in confidentiality and the potential injury to the
free flow of information that disclosure portends on the opposite pan.
Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp., 162 F.3d 708,716 (1st Cir. 1998) (citations omitted).
Some courts have gone beyond the balancing test and have adopted formalized tests to
determine whether ajournalist must disclose relevant information. See Miller v. Transamerican
Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721, 726 (5th Cir. 1980) ("(1) is the information relevant, (2) can the
information be obtained by alternative means, and (3) is there a compelling interest in the
information?"); see also Baum, supra, at 570-71.
In some circuits, the privilege against compelled disclosure extends to nonconfidential
sources and information. See Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1295 (9th Cir. 1993) ("[W]e hold
that the journalist's privilege applies to a journalist's resource materials even in the absence of
the element of confidentiality."). However, some jurisdictions have held that the privilege
applies only to confidential materials. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 135 F.3d 963, 972 (5th
Cir. 1998) ("We conclude that newsreporters enjoy no qualified privilege not to disclose
nonconfidential information in criminal cases?'). The courts have also disagreed as to whether
the privilege extends to both criminal and civil cases. Compare Shoen, 5 F.3d at 1292 ("I]he
journalists' privilege recognized in Branzburg was a 'partial First Amendment shield' that
protects journalists against compelled disclosure in all judicial proceedings, civil and criminal
alike.") (quoting Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464,467 (9th Cir. 1975)) with Zerilli v. Smith, 656
F.2d 705, 711 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("Although Branzburg may limit the scope of the reporter's
First Amendment privilege in criminal proceedings, this circuit has previously held that in civil
cases, where the public interest in effective criminal enforcement is absent, that case is not
controlling.").
7 See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 799-800 (1978) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring) ("mhe Press Clause focuses specifically on the liberty to disseminate expression
broadly and 'comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and
opinion."') (quoting Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444,452 (1938)).
8 See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for
redress of grievances."); see also Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 799-801; Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S.
665, 704 (1972) ("Freedom of the press is a 'fundamental personal right' which 'is not
confined to newspapers and periodicals.") (quoting Lovell, 303 U.S. at 444,450,452); Carl C.
Monk, Evidentiary Privilege for Journalists' Sources: Theory and Statutory Protection, 51
Mo. L. REV. 1, 32-33 (1986) ('The Supreme Court has generally defined the term 'press' very
broadly, as a result of which the [F]irst [A]mendment and [E]qual [P]rotection clauses have
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courts have adopted a very broad test to determine who has standing as a
journalist. This test, articulated in von Bulow v. von Bulow,9 requires a factual
inquiry into the intent of the individual asserting the privilege.' 0 One may assert
the privilege if, at the inception of the newsgathering process, that individual has
the intent to disseminate the information to the public." This test, which has
come to be known as the von Bulow test, has been applied broadly to afford
protection to authors and academics as well as journalists. 12
However, a recent decision by the Third Circuit, In re Madden,13 casts doubt
on the ability of the von Bulow test to adequately protect nontraditional
journalists, specifically those who practice the new journalism. That case
involved a professional wrestling commentator's attempt to assert the privilege
for reports he made on a 1-900 telephone line.14 While a topic as trivial as
professional wrestling may not set off alarms for First Amendment defenders,
the court's reasoning leaves the new journalism vulnerable to increased threats of
compelled disclosure.
In Part II, this Comment will analyze Branzburg and its impact on federal
courts' adoption of the journalist's privilege. Part E[[ will examine how the von
Bulow test rose to prominence while Part IV discusses how the Madden court
misapplied the test. Part V explains the potential consequences Madden poses for
the new journalism. Finally, Part VI attempts to combat a potential Madden
analysis by offering an expanded functional definition of the press to determine
who may qualify for the journalist's privilege.
II. BRANZBURG v 1A YES AND THE FEDERAL CouRTS
The qualified journalist's privilege against compelled disclosure arose from
the confusing and controversial Branzburg15 opinions. The Supreme Court
consolidated the cases of three reporters who refused to testify before grand
been held to prohibit discrimination against 'non-establishment' and 'irregular' media").
9 811 F.2d 136 (2d Cir. 1987).
10 Id. at 144.
11 Id.
12 See Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp., 162 F.3d 708, 714-15 (1st Cir. 1998) (granting
privilege to academic researchers); Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1293-94 (9th Cir. 1993)
(granting privilege to the author of an investigative book); Kraig L. Baker, Comment, Are
Oliver Stone and Tom Clancy Journalists? Determining Who Has Standing to Claim the
Journalist's Privilege, 69 WASH. L. REV. 739, 749 (1994) (discussing when courts have
granted the privilege to nontraditional journalists).
13 151 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 1998).
14 See infra notes 68-76 and accompanying text.
15 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
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juries. 16 Although the plurality opinion ruled against an absolute privilege for
journalists, 17 Justice Powell's concurrence emphasized the limited nature of the
Court's holding.18 His frustratingly short opinion19 endorsed a qualified
privilege that balances "freedom of the press and the obligation of all citizens to
16 See id. at 667-79. Two of the consolidated cases involved Paul Branzburg's coverage
of Kentucky's illegal drug culture. Branzburg's newspaper "carried a story under [his] by-line
describing in detail his observations of two young residents of Jefferson County synthesizing
hashish from marihuana ... " Id. at 667. A later story included interviews with "several dozen
drug users in [Frankfort]" and Branzburg's observations of "several unnamed drug users." Id
at 669.
The other two cases involved coverage of the Black Panther Party. Television Reporter
Paul Pappas was allowed to remain at Black Panther headquarters in New Bedford,
Massachusetts on the condition that he not "disclose anything he saw or heard... except an
anticipated police raid, which Pappas, 'on his own,' was free to photograph and report as he
wished." Id. at 672. The police raid never materialized and Pappas was later called before a
grand jury investigating Black Panther activity. Id. at 672-73. Earl Caldwell covered the Black
Panthers for the New York Times. The government sought to compel "'[n]otes and tape
recordings of interviews ... reflecting statements made for publication by officers and
spokesmen for the Black Panther Party concerning the aims and purposes of said organization
and the activities of said organization.... "' Id. at 675-76 n.12. The journalists refused to
testify by citing their First Amendment rights as news reporters:
[The reporters'] press First Amendment claims... [which] may be simply put. that to
gather news it is often necessary to agree either not to identify the source of information
published or to publish only part of the facts revealed, or both; that if the reporter is
nevertheless forced to reveal these confidences to a grand jury, the source so identified
and other confidential sources of other reporters will be measurably deterred from
furnishing publishable information, all to the detriment of the free flow of information
protected by the First Amendment
Id. at 679-80.
17 The journalists in the Branzburg cases "[did] not claim an absolute privilege against
official interrogation in all circumstances... ." Id. at 680. Rather, they argued for a balancing
test that weighed the reporter's First Amendment rights against the government's need for the
information. See id. Professor Marcus has remarked: "Strangely, Justice White either
misconstrued the reporters' position, or chose to interpret it as encompassing an assertion of
absolute privilege. Indeed, much of the opinion is written as if the media representatives had
specifically requested that the Court announce an absolute First Amendment privilege.' Paul
Marcus, The Reporter's Privilege: An Analysis of the Common Law, Branzburg v. Hayes, and
Recent Statutory Developments, 25 ARIZ. L. REV. 815, 823 (1984).
18 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring) ("I add this brief statement to
emphasize what seems to me to be the limited nature of the Court's holding").
19 See Marcus, supra note 17, at 829 ("[Tjhe initial complaint to be leveled against the
extremely short concurring opinion of Justice Powell is its brevity") (citation omitted).
1999] 1593
OHIO STATELAWJOURIVAL
give relevant testimony with respect to criminal conduct."20 Because five
justices in Branzburg recognized some kind of journalist's privilege, a majority
of the circuits21 interpreted a qualified privilege from Powell's concurrence and
the dissent.22
20 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring).
21 See, e.g., Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp., 162 F.3d 708, 714 (1st Cir. 1998) ("Courts
afford journalists a measure of protection from discovery initiatives in order not to undermine
their ability to gather and disseminate information."); In re Madden, 151 F.3d 125, 128 (3d Cir.
1998) ("[W]e have recognized that when a journalist, in the course of gathering the news,
acquires facts that become a target of discovery, a qualified privilege against compelled
disclosure appertains."); Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1292-93 (9th Cir. 1993) (interpreting
Branzburg "as establishing such a qualified privilege for journalists"); von Bulow v. von
Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 142-43 (2d Cir. 1987) (finding that the Branzburg Court
"recognized... that a qualified privilege may be proper in some circumstances because
newsgathering was not without First Amendment protection"); LaRouche v. NBC, 780 F.2d
1134, 1139 (4th Cir. 1986) ('In determining whether the journalist's privilege will protect the
source in a given situation, it is necessary to balance the interests involved."); Zerilli v. Smith,
656 F.2d 705, 712 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("We indicated.. .that a qualified reporter's privilege
under the First Amendment should be readily available in civil cases:"); Miller v.
Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721, 725 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding "that a reporter has a
First Amendment privilege which protects the refusal to disclose the identity of confidential
informants'); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433, 437 (10th Cir. 1977) ("[Ihe
Court's discussion in both the majority opinion of Justice White and the concurring opinion of
Justice Powell recognizing a privilege which protects information given in confidence to a
reporter is important."). But see In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 810 F.2d 580, 584 (6th Cir.
1987) ("[W]e decline to join some other circuits ... [that] have thereupon adopted the qualified
privilege balancing process urged by the three [sic] Branzburg dissenters and rejected by the
majority").
Courts and scholars believed that the Eighth Circuit adopted the qualified journalist's
privilege in Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986, 991 (8th Cir. 1972) (holding that statements
that "touch and concern issues of public or general concern" must have actual malice to be
defamatory). See Shoen, 5 F.3d at 1292 n.5; Baker, supra note 12, at 747 n.64. The Eighth
Circuit, however, recently declared that the question of a journalist's privilege "is an open one
in this circuit." In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 918 n.8 (8th Cir.
1997).
22 See Baker, supra note 12, at 747 ("Four justices concluded that reporters could be
compelled to disclose their sources; four justices said they could not be so compelled; and
Justice Powell took a middle position by allowing compelled disclosure in some circumstances
but not in others."); Monk, supra note 8, at 24 (' Thus a majority, consisting of the four
dissenters and Powell, explicitly recognized a constitutional right to protect sources."). For an
excellent discussion of the Branzburg decision, see Marcus, supra note 17, at 821-39.
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A. Branzburg's Unheeded Warning
The Branzburg plurality rejected the journalist's privilege,23 in part, because
of the difficulties in determining who would be eligible for the privilege.24 It
wrote: "We are unwilling to embark the judiciary on a long and difficult journey
to such an uncertain destination. The administration of a constitutional
newsman's privilege would present practical and conceptual difficulties of a high
order."25 The Court warned that a constitutional journalist's privilege would
require courts to define those journalists who qualified for the privilege, a
questionable procedure in light of traditional First Amendment doctrine.26
Courts attempting to define the press would face difficulty because the Press
Clause "comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of
information and opinion."2 7 The plurality emphasized that freedom of the press
is a "fundamental personal right" that offers the same protection to the lonely
pamphleteer as it does for the major metropolitan newspaper. 8
Although the Supreme Court has recognized the role of the press in
American society,29 Branzburg reinforces the Court's view that the First
Amendment does not entitle the institutionalized press to heightened
protection.30 The Court in Branzburg wrote that "[fireedom of the press... 'is
23 The Court, however, welcomed Congress and the state legislatures to pass journalist's
privilege statutes. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 706 (1972) ("Congress has freedom
to determine whether a statutory newsman's privilege is necessary and desirable .... There is
also merit in leaving state legislatures free, within First Amendment limits, to fashion their own
standards... :). While Congress has not acted, over half the states have adopted some type of
press shield law. See Marcus, supra note 17, at 859-67 (discussing the statutory response to the
journalist's privilege).
24 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 703-04. The plurality also emphasized the importance of the
grand jury system, the public interest in effective law enforcement, and the belief that the press
has flourished for decades without constitutional protection. Id. at 687-88, 698-99.
2 5 Id. at 703-04.
2 6 Id at704.
27 Id. (quoting Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444,452 (1938)).
2 8 See id
29 See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 781-82 (1978) ("The press
cases emphasize the special and constitutionally recognized role of that institution in informing
and educating the public, offering criticism, and providing a forum for discussion and
debate").
30 See Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 668 (1990)
("mhe press' unique societal role may not entitle the press to greater protection under the
Constitution.. . ") (citing Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 782); Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 782-83 ("Mhe press
does not have a monopoly on either the First Amendment or the ability to enlighten.)
(citations omitted); Tung Yin, Comment, Post-Modern Printing Presses: Extending Freedom
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not confined to newspapers and periodicals."' 31 Rather, freedom of the press
belongs to all individuals who assert their First Amendment rights. 32 According
to the Branzburg plurality, courts would risk granting extra constitutional
protection to the institutional press if they attempted to classify those journalists
eligible for the privilege.33 Eventually, the Court surmised, the application of
such a privilege could lead to discrimination based on content, an outcome
traditionally prohibited by the First Amendment.34
B. The Federal Courts' Response
A majority of federal jurisdictions ignored Branzburg's warning and
embraced the qualified journalist's privilege.3 5 Before the Second Circuit
developed a test to handle nontraditional journalism,3 6 very few cases had
grappled with the issue of granting the journalist's privilege to nontraditional
journalists. 37 However, those cases were mindful of the historic connotation of
of Press to Protect Electronic Information Services, 8 HIGH TECH L.J. 311, 334 (1993)
(discussing the Court's "refus[al] to make the institutional press stronger than the non-
institutional press").
31 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 704 (quoting Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444,450,452
(1938)).
32 See id. ("Freedom of the press is a findamental personal right."); see also Bellotti, 435
U.S. at 802 (Burger, CI., concurring) (stating "the First Amendment does not belong to any
definable category of persons or entities" but to "all who exercise its freedoms").
33 See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Prying, Spying, and Lying: Intrusive Newsgathering and
What the Law ShouldDo About It, 73 TUL. L. REV. 173, 229-30 (1998). Lidsky points out the
following:
If the Court were to create a constitutional privilege to gather news, the Court would have
to resolve an issue it has traditionally avoided: who is the press? The Court would be
forced to decide whether to continue to accord the 'lonely pamphleteer' as much First
Amendment protection as the institutional press.
Id.
34 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 705 nA0 ("[T]he First Amendment ordinarily prohibits
courts from inquiring into the content of expression .... By affording a privilege to some
organs of communication but not to others, courts would inevitably be discriminating on the
basis of content.") (citations omitted).
35 See supra note 21 (discussing the federal courts' adoption of the journalist's privilege).3 6 See von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 142 (2d Cir. 1987) (emphasizing the
journalist's intent at the inception of the newsgathering process). Since its inception, four
circuits have used the von Bulow test to determine whether an individual has standing to assert
the journalist's privilege. See infra note 53.
37 See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433, 436 (10th Cir. 1977) (granting the
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the press 38 and the Supreme Court's assertion that the informative function of the
press has been performed by those outside of the traditional media.39
In Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corporation,40 a documentary filmmaker
investigating the death of a nuclear power worker assured the film's participants
that their identities would be kept confidential. 41 The filmmaker asserted the
journalist's privilege when Kerr-McGee tried to compel the disclosure of
confidential information surrounding Karen Silkwood's death.42 While never
proclaiming the issue dispositive, the Silkwood decision considered the
filmmaker's intent at the inception of gathering news for the documentary: 43
"His mission in this case was to carry out investigative reporting for use in the
preparation of a documentary film.... [I]t cannot be disputed that his intention,
at least, was to make use of this in preparation of the film."44 This notion
inspired the seminal decision on journalist's privilege and nontraditional
journalism, von Bulow v. von Bulow.45
II. THE RISE OF VONBULOW
The Second Circuit fashioned the von Bulow test in response to an author's
attempt to assert the journalist's privilege. The underlying suit alleged that Claus
von Bulow secretly injected his wife with drugs causing her to lapse into a
permanent coma.4 6 Martha von Bulow's children attempted to compel the
disclosure of an unpublished manuscript about the events surrounding Claus von
Bulow's criminal prosecution. 47 The court ruled against the manuscript's author
privilege to a documentary filmmaker); Apicella v. McNeil Lab., Inc., 66 F.R.D. 78, 84-85
(E.D.N.Y. 1975) (granting the privilege to the chief executive officer of a pharmaceutical trade
publication).
3 8 See Silkwood, 563 F.2d at 437 (noting that the Supreme Court has not limited the
privilege to traditional journalism).
3 9 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 705 ('The informative function asserted by representatives
of the organized press ... is also performed by lecturers, political pollsters, novelists, academic
researchers, and dramatists."); Apicella, 66 F.R.D. at 84 (describing the groups other than
traditional reporters who perform the informative function of the press) (citing Branzburg, 408
U.S. at 705).
40 563 F.2d 433 (1Oth Cir. 1977).
41 See id. at 435.
42 See id. at 434-35.
43 See id. at 436-37.
44Id.
45 811 F.2d 136 (2d Cir. 1987).
4 6 See id. at 139.
47 See id. at 138.
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because she originally gathered information for personal uses, such as the
vindication of her close friend, Claus von Bulow. 48 By focusing on the author's
intent, however, the von Bulow decision formally paved the way for
nontraditional journalists to assert the journalist's privilege.
A. The von Bulow Test
The von Bulow opinion explained how to determine whether an individual
qualifies as a journalist.49 To successfully claim the privilege, an individual must
"demonstrate, through competent evidence, the intent to use material... to
disseminate information to the public and that such intent existed at the inception
of the newsgathering process."50 Furthermore, the court explicitly stated that
nontraditional journalists could successfully assert the privilege.51 Although one
portion of von Bulow has been controversial, 52 courts have readily endorsed both
the intent-based test and the proposition that nontraditional journalists may assert
the privilege. To date, four circuits have explicitly adopted the von Bulow test.
53
48 See id. at 144. The author, Andrea Reynolds, accompanied Claus von Bulow during
the criminal proceedings that resulted in his acquittal on charges of "assault with intent to
murder his wife." Id. at 139.
49 See id. at 142.
50 Id. at 144.
51 See id. at 142 ("[A]n individual successfully may assert the journalist's
privilege.., even though he may not ordinarily be a member of the institutionalized press.");
id. at 144-45 ("[Tjhe protection from disclosure may be sought by one not traditionally
associated with the institutionalized press ... ).
527Te opinion recognized a privilege for non-confidential sources of information.
However, some courts have ruled against such a privilege. See United States v. Smith, 135
F.3d 963, 972 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that the qualified journalist's privilege does not protect
nonconfidential information in criminal cases). But see Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1295(9th
Cir. 1993) (holding that the journalist's privilege applies to resource materials even in the
absence of confidentiality).
53 Besides the Second Circuit, the Ninth, Third, and First Circuits have explicitly
endorsed the von Bulow test. See Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp., 162 F.3d 708, 714-15 (1st
Cir. 1998) (granting the privilege to academics); In re Madden, 151 F.3d 125, 130 (3d Cir.
1998) (granting the privilege to investigative reporters and newsgatherers); Shoen, 5 F.3d at
1293-94 (granting the privilege to investigative authors). The D.C. district court applied the
von Bulow test in an unpublished decision. See Alexander v. FBI, 186 F.R.D. 21, 50 (D.D.C.
1998) (applying the von Bulow test). One court has rejected von Bulow, but that was a state
court refusing to extend the state's '"nedia subpoena law." See Matera v. Superior Court, 825
P.2d 971,975 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992).
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B. The False Promise ofvon Bulow
The intent-based analysis of von Bulow appears flexible enough to cover
those situations where nontraditional journalists serve the traditional functions of
the press. The test's backers assert that by looking into the newgatherer's intent,
courts should be able to avoid the mode of dissemination-based analysis that
frightened the Branzburg plurality.54 The test's application to all modes of
dissemination ostensibly makes the test flexible enough to adapt to changes in
media and the ways in which people receive news.5 5 Finally, by requiring the
intent to disseminate information to the public, the test grants the privilege only
to members of the legitimate press, another Branzburg concern. 56 The von
Bulow test should be the final word on standing to assert the journalist's
privilege. However, the test has a fatal flaw in its deceptively simple wording.
This flaw, which has only recently been exposed, threatens the changing face of
journalism.
The Branzburg57 plurality worried that application of a journalist's privilege
might lead to content-based discrimination. Justice White demonstrated this fear
by invoking hypothetical sham newspapers, designed by criminals to shield
illegal activity from grand jury inquiry.58 Explaining his position, Justice White
wrote: "It might appear that such 'sham' newspapers would be easily
distinguishable, yet the First Amendment ordinarily prohibits courts from
inquiring into the content of expression... -59 The von Bulow test seems to
overcome this problem by looking into the intent of the newspaper operators. If
the operators intend for their newspaper to shield activity from grand jury
proceedings, rather than as a means of disseminating information, they will fail
to qualify as journalists.60
However promising von Bulow may seem, the test does not prevent all
inquiries into content. The term "newsgathering" requires, by its very definition,
54 See Baker, supra note 12, at 755 ("Since the test emphasizes the intent behind the
newsgathering process and not the mode of dissemination, it is consistent with the Supreme
Court's recognition that the press includes all publications that contribute to the free flow of
information.!).
55 See id.
56 See id. ("The test does not grant standing to any person with a manuscript or film, but
requires an intent to disseminate news to the public at the inception of the newsgathering
process.") (emphasis in original).
57 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
58 See id. at 705 n.40.
59 Id. (citations omitted).
60 See Baker, supra note 12, at 752-53 (comparing newsletters to the "sham" newspapers
in Branzburg).
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a content-based determination of what constitutes "news." This determination
invites the type of content-based discrimination that Branzburg attempted to
thwart.61 Furthermore, some advocates of the von Bulow approach assert that
courts should make value determinations based upon the finished products of
individuals claiming the privilege. 62 While the situations that give rise to a von
Bulow analysis have been rare, they are likely to become more prevalent as the
internet and alternative media sources play larger roles in the way Americans
receive their news.63 Members of the "new" media should be concerned that
content-driven applications of the von Bulow test, like the analysis in In re
Madden,64 pose a threat to their ability to disseminate news.
IV. INREMADDENAND THE INADEQUACY OF THE VONBULOWTEST
While the von Bulow test has been embraced by courts65 and at least one
commentator,66 In re Madden demonstrates the test's inability to adequately
address situations involving nontraditional journalism. Although deceptively
simple, the von Bulow language invites the type of content-based discrimination
that the Supreme Court feared when deciding Branzburg.67 As In re Madden
demonstrates, judicial notions of what journalism should be can defeat the strict
application of the von Bulow test. The silent biases against nontraditional
journalism, whether in content or in form, should not be allowed to defeat an
intent-based analysis. In re Madden, however, invites courts to completely forgo
questions of intent and cloak their contempt for nontraditional journalists in the
language of von Bulow.
61 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. 705 at nA0.
62 See Baker, supra note 12, at 760-63 (arguing that the privilege should not be extended
to a very expansive class of supposed creative fiction authors).
63 Two circuit courts applied the von Bulow test in 1998 alone. Before 1998, no circuit
court had ruled on the test since 1993. See supra note 53.
64 151 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 1998).
6 5 See, e.g., Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding the von Bulow
Court's reasoning persuasive); see also supra note 53 (discussing the jurisdictions that have
adopted the von Bulow test).
66 See Baker, supra note 12, at 755 ('The von Bulow test should be adopted by all circuits
to determine whether an individual or group has standing to claim the journalist's privilege.").
67 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 705 nA0 (1972) ("By affording a privilege to
some organs of communication but not to others, courts would inevitably be discriminating on
the basis of content.").
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A. The Underlying Facts
In re Madden stemmed from a lawsuit involving the two largest professional
wrestling promotions in the United States.68 The World Wrestling Federation
(WWF) sued World Championship Wrestling (WCW) claiming copyright
inftingement, unfair trade practices, and other state law claims.69 The suit arose
when two popular WWF wrestlers, Kevin Nash and Scott Hall, contracted with
the rival WCW.70 The WWF claimed that WCW attempted to deceive the public
by fostering the belief that "inter-promotional matches" 71 would take place on
WCW television programs.72 The WWF alleged that WCW's 1-900 telephone
hotline, featuring the reports of Mark Madden, purposely disseminated false
information to support the ruse.73 In an attempt to discover the source of the
reports, the WWF deposed Madden.74 Madden, however, invoked the
journalist's privilege and refused to reveal his sources.75
Using the von Bulow test, the district court found that Madden could assert
the privilege because he had the intent to disseminate information at the
inception of the newsgathering process.76 The WWF appealed the decision.
68 151 F.3d at 126.
6 9 See id.
70 See Titan Sports, Inc. v. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 981 F. Supp. 65, 67 (D. Conn. 1997).
71 The WWF does not allow their wrestlers to engage in matches with WCW wrestlers.
The WWF would not want their wrestlers to 'lose"' to WCW wrestlers because the public
might view WCW wrestlers as superior. Furthermore, the WWF does not want to promote the
rival promotion's product. The WCW shares this policy for the same reasons. As a result,
wrestling fans have long been enticed by the prospect of inter-promotional matches featuring
WWF wrestlers "competing" against WCW wrestlers for the first time.
72 See Titan Sports, 981 F. Supp. at 67.
73 See id. In addition to providing content for 1-900 hotline reports, Madden worked as a
sportswriter for the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette. See, e.g., Mark Madden, Boon over Miami:
Hockey Interest Grows in Florida Sunshine, Where Even the Latin Community Embraces It,
Prrr. POST-GAzEIrE, May 24, 1996, at Cl, available in 1995 WL 7659965 (discussing
professional hockey's success in Southern Florida); Mark Madden, Third Strike Means
Curtains for Cleveland, Prr. POST-GAZETrE, Jan. 8, 1995, at C6, available in 1995 WL
3357955 (discussing a professional football game between the Pittsburgh Steelers and the
Cleveland Browns).
74 See In re Madden, 151 F.3d 125, 126 (3d Cir. 1998).
75 See id.
76 See Titan Sports, Inc. v. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 967 F. Supp. 142, 145 (W.D. Pa.
1997) rev'd, In re Madden, 151 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 1998).
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B. The Madden Court's Misapplication ofvon Bulow
An examination of the appellate court's reasoning demonstrates potential
content-based discrimination as well as discrimination against the mode of
dissemination. The Third Circuit endorsed the von Bulow test as appropriate,77
but the court overturned the district court's application of the test.78 Specifically,
the court believed that professional wrestling did not qualify as news. Because
wrestling involves choreographed matches featuring larger-than-life characters,
the court stated that Madden authored creative fiction while disseminating hype
and advertisement. Moreover, the court found, "Madden's information was
given to him directly by WCW executives."79 As a result, the court held that he
did not act as a journalist.
Further, the Third Circuit ruled against Madden because he mixed
entertainment with reporting. Because his reports included entertainment, the
court stated that Madden did not intend to disseminate information to the public.
Instead, as an author of entertaining fiction, the court found that Madden
intended to create a work of art or entertainment. 80
7 7 See Madden, 151 F.3d at 130 ("The district court correctly looked to von Bulow as the




80 See id. Madden's experience as a professional journalist did not persuade the Third
Circuit even though "prior experience as a professional journalist may be persuasive evidence
of present intent to gather [information] for the purpose of dissemination." von Bulow v. von
Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 144 (2d Cir. 1987). The Pittsburgh Post-Gazette employed Madden
while he provided commentaries for the 1-900 wrestling hotline. Although Madden's
newspaper articles covered traditional sports such as football, the Post-Gazette sometimes
published articles he wrote about professional wrestling. See, e.g., Mark Madden, Gritty Cactus
Jack to Wrestle at Carlynton, Prrr. PosT-GAZETE, Jan. 19, 1995, at W1 1, available in 1995
WL 33643331 (profiling Cactus Jack, a famous professional wrestler scheduled to wrestle in
Western Pennsylvania)[hereinafter Madden, Gritty Cactus].
Madden's article about Cactus Jack, in particular, features many of the elements that
comprise Madden's hotline commentaries. Madden's "commentaries promote upcoming
WCW wrestling events and pay-per-view television programs, armounce the results of
wrestling matches and discuss wrestlers' personal lives and careers." Madden, 151 F.3d at 126.
In comparison, the Cactus Jack article promotes an independent wrestling card at a
Pennsylvania High School. See Madden, Gritty Cactus, supra at W11 ("Cactus Jack, 30,
brings his act to Carlynton High School for an indy show Saturday at 7:30 p.m.").
Furthermore, the article discusses some of Cactus Jack's previous matches, including a "pay-
per-view TV match with partner Kevin Sullivan against the Nasty Boys." Id. Finally,
Madden's article discusses Cactus Jack's career and personal life. See id. (discussing Cactus
Jack's career as an independent wrestler and his Western Pennsylvania roots).
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1. Madden Was Not Gathering News
According to the In re Madden court, professional wrestling does not qualify
as news: "[T]he district court read the von Bulow decision too expansively and in
doing so elided the requirement that the individual be engaged in the activity of
newsgathering or investigative reporting."81 The opinion states that even though
Madden "sought, gathered, or received" materials from WCW to disseminate on
the hotline, more would be required to qualify for the privilege.82 The court
reiterated that von Bulow requires Madden to gather news.83
However, this analysis cannot be made without a court deciding what should
or should not be considered news, a result that runs afoul of constitutional
principles. 84 While paying lip service to Madden's intent, the Third Circuit
ultimately decided that his reports were not news and therefore unworthy of
protection. 85
Although mode of dissemination is not a factor in a von Bulow analysis, see von Bulow,
811 F.2d at 144-45, the similarities between Madden's hotline commentaries and his
newspaper articles demonstrate the essential weaknesses in the Madden court's logic. If the
court denied standing to Madden the newspaper reporter, instead of Madden the hotline
commentator, the court would engage in clear content discrimination. A newspaper reporter is,
by definition, a traditional journalist who gathers information with the intent to disseminate that
information in newspaper articles. For that reason, it would be difficult for the Third Circuit to
deny standing to Madden the newspaper reporter without blatantly discriminating against
content related to professional wrestling. Madden's wrestling hotline reports featured
information similar to the information contained within his newspaper articles. Nonetheless,
the court refused to protect Madden the hotline commentator. This result leaves the court with a
difficult choice should an individual raise the journalist's privilege for a newspaper article
about professional wrestling. A court faced with this issue may grant standing and
acknowledge that the Madden decision discriminated on the basis of mode of dissemination, or




84 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 705 nAO (1972) ("Mhe First Amendment
ordinarily prohibits courts from inquiring into the content of expression ... and protects speech
and publications regardless of their motivation, orthodoxy, truthfulness, timeliness, or taste:)
(citations omitted).
85 This Case Comment expresses no opinion as to whether Madden's sources and
information should have been privileged. Instead, this Case Comment argues that Madden
should have been allowed to assert the privilege. It is quite possible that, under a balancing test,
the information might prove to be discoverable. Madden's interest in confidentiality and the
potential injury to the free flow of information might be of such little value as to warrant
compelled disclosure. See Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp., 162 F.3d 708, 716 (lst Cir. 1998)
(discussing the balancing test). Madden's sources were all WCW employees, so the interests in
anonymity do not raise the same implications as a corporate or government whistleblower
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Professional wrestling has received little critical attention in the United
States.86 However, wrestling remains one of the most popular forms of
entertainment in the world.87 One may debate the merits of wrestling, but the
genre's popularity cannot be questioned. The election of former wrestler Jesse
Ventura as governor of Minnesota, 88 along with the attention-albeit skeptical-
of the mainstream press, demonstrates the public interest in professional
wrestling. Moreover, when dealing with privacy and publicity issues, at least one
federal court has announced the newsworthiness of professional wrestling and
the public figure status of professional wrestlers.89
Because of the public interest in professional wrestling, the Third Circuit
apparently engaged in discrimination based on the content of Madden's reports
in declaring that information about wrestling does not qualify as news.90 The
fearing retaliation. Furthermore, the interests in the free flow of information concerning
professional wrestling may not warrant extra constitutional protection. Jurisdictions applying a
formalized three-part test may come to similar conclusions. See Baum, supra note 6, at 571
(discussing the test used by some federal courts). This Case Comment contends, however, that
Madden's intention was to disseminate news about wrestling and that such an intention existed
at the inception of the newsgathering process. As a result, he should have been allowed to
assert the qualified journalist's privilege provided by von Bulow. Whether the information
would withstand the qualified privilege should have no bearing on this analysis.
8 6 See Chris Heath, Stone Cold Steve Austin, ROLLiNG STONE, Dec. 24, 1998-Jan. 7,
1999, at 122, 130 (describing the small amount of academic literature on wrestling). Some
critics contend that the lack of serious attention allows professional wrestling to escape scrutiny
for allegedly anti-social and offensive programming that would not be tolerated in other forms
of mass entertainment. See Phil Mushnick, Sportsview, Wrestling: Who's Pile-Driving Whom?,
TV GUIDE, Dec. 19-25, 1998, at 54, 54 ("A vast majority of the media still considers pro
wrestling a cartoon world. So a twisted, sickening industry grows wealthy while operating with
impunity.... On any given night kids are 'entertained' by warfare between racially segregated
gangs, ethnic stereotyping, degradation of women and wrestlers who wave toward their
crotches... ."); Phil Rosenthal, Family Fight: Promoters Don't Wrestle with Their
Consciences, C. SUN TIMEs, Jan. 28, 1999, at 39 (criticizing the WWF for targeting children
with "raunchy" and "tasteless" programs).
8 7 See Breakthroughs '98 New Faces We Couldn't Help but Notice, PEOPLE, Dec. 28,
1998-Jan. 4, 1999, at 114, 114-15 (stating that wrestling attracts some 40 million viewers
weekly); Heath, supra note 86, at 123 (saying that on Monday nights, more young men will
watch wrestling than watch professional football).
8 8 See generally Steve Lopez, Ready to Rumble "Hoo-Yah!" Jesse Ventura Takes Oflce
as Governor of Minnesota with the Battle Cry of the Navy SEALs, TIME, Jan. 18, 1999, at 38,
38-40 (describing Ventura's election and inauguration).
8 9 See Titan Sports, Inc. v. Comics World Corp., 870 F.2d 85, 88--89 (2d Cir. 1989)
(finding genuine issue of material fact as to whether posters of professional wrestlers in
newsstand publication were for purposes of trade and not incidental to the dissemination of
news).
9 0 See In re Madden, 151 F.3d 125, 130 (3d Cir. 1998) ("Mr. Madden was not
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First Amendment protects entertainment, as well as ideological speech.9 1
Furthermore, the First Amendment protects journalists who report on matters
related to entertainment and sports. The New York Times Co. v. Sullivan9 2
defamation standard of actual malice93 applies to journalists reporting on those
entertainers and athletes deemed to be public figures. 94 However, the In re
Madden court deemed professional wrestling without journalistic merit. Such a
result clearly violates traditional First Amendment doctrine protecting speech
from inquiries into content 95
2. Madden 's Reports Were Creative Fiction
In re Madden proclaimed that Madden's reports on professional wrestling
amounted to little more than creative fiction.96 Obviously, the storylines and
matches of professional wrestling are scripted and choreographed, 97 but the
investigating 'news,' even were we to apply a generous definition of the word.").
91 See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981) ("Entertainment, as
well as political and ideological speech, is protected; motion pictures, programs broadcast by
radio and television, and live entertainment, such as musical and dramatic works, fall within the
First Amendment guarantee!") (citations omitted).
92 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
93 The Constitution requires "a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering
damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the
statement was made with 'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." Id. at 279-80.
94 See, e.g., Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206, 208-09 (7th Cir. 1976) (finding
that a popular television entertainer was a public figure and that the actual malice standard
applied); Bell v. Associated Press, 584 F. Supp. 128, 130-32 (D.D.C. 1984) (finding that a
professional football player was a public figure and that the actual malice standard applied).
95 See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 799-800 (1978) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring) (quoting Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444,452 (1938)) ("Mhe Press Clause
focuses specifically on the liberty to disseminate expression broadly and 'comprehends every
sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion."); Branzburg v. Hayes,
408 U.S. 665, 705 nA0 (1972) ("By affording a privilege to some organs of communication
but not to others, courts would inevitably be discriminating on the basis of content."); William
P. Marshal & Susan Gilles, The Supreme Court, The First Amendment, and Bad Journalism,
1994 Sup. Cr. REv. 169, 171 ("[B]oth superficial and serious journalism are entitled to equal
constitutional weight."); Monk, supra note 8, at 32-33 ("The Supreme Court has generally
defined the term 'press' very broadly, as a result of which the First Amendment and Equal
Protection clauses have been held to prohibit discrimination against 'non-establishment' and
'irregular' media.').
96 See In re Madden, 151 F.3d 125, 130 (3d Cir. 1998).
97 See Heath, supra note 86, at 123 (describing professional wrestling as a kind of vicious
cooperation with exaggerated story lines).
1999] 1605
OHIO STATE LA WJOURWAL
performers and executives involved with wrestling are real people. The
underlying suit that spurred In re Madden demonstrates that genuine events can
be associated with the world of wrestling. The WWF's popular Scott Hall and
Kevin Nash, the performers who portrayed the characters of Razor Ramon and
Diesel, sought employment with a rival organization.98 The wrestlers' decision
to jump to WCW was not motivated by a storyline or choreographed chicanery.
Instead, the wrestlers were motivated by "lucrative, guaranteed contracts."99 The
Third Circuit decided that Madden's work was fiction because his reports were
about wrestlers who portrayed fictional characters within the wrestling ring.'00
This is not precisely true: his reports were about the real-life business dealings of
the men behind the characters. Just as a story about a popular wrestler's legal
problems cannot be considered fiction, 1 1 a story about a wrestler's contract
status has a basis in reality.
3. Madden Used Improper Journalistic Techniques
In applying the von Bulow test, the court examined the methods Madden
used to obtain information. According to the decision, Madden could not be
98 See Titan Sports, Inc. v. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 981 F. Supp. 65, 66-67 (D. Conn.
1997) (describing the circumstances behind Hall and Nash's departure from the WWF).
99 Id. at 67. The WWF tried to dispel any notion that Hall and Nash were involved in a
storyline by announcing that the performers were no longer associated with the company. See
id.
100 See Madden, 151 F.3d at 130 ("Madden's work amounts to little more than creative
fiction about admittedly fictional characters who have dramatic and ferocious sounding
pseudonyms like 'Razor Ramon' and 'Diesel.").
101 See Mark Bixler, Wrestler Pleads Guilty to Assault in Cherokee, ATLANTA CONST.,
Dec. 9, 1998, at B I (stating that a popular wrestler pled guilty to felony assault charges); Dave
Goldiner, Sable Slams WWF with Harass Suit, N.Y. DAILY NEWs, June 5, 1999, at 8
(discussing a sexual harassment suit filed against the WWF by a popular female wrestler).
Quite aside from the legal problems of some wrestlers, the tragic death of professional
wrestler Owen Hart underscores the very real nature of certain events within the industry. Hart
died during a pay-per-view wrestling program when he fell to the ring after being suspended
above the arena floor. See Jerry Adler et al., Death in the Ring, NEVsWEEK, June 7, 1999, at
64, 64-65 (describing the circumstances surrounding Hart's death). Some of the nation's most
influential newspapers covered Hart's death. See, e.g., Colin Nickerson, Wrestler's Life Ended
Where It Began, BOSTON GLOBE, May 27, 1999, at Al; Stunt Turns into Tragedy for Pro
Wrestler Owen Hart, WAsH. PoT, May 25, 1999, at D02.
Clearly, the Boston Globe and Washington Post would have standing to claim the
joumalist's privilege for stories related to Owen Hart's death. The Third Circuit, however,
might not grant standing to Madden for hotline commentaries discussing the Hart tragedy.
Already, the court declared that Madden was not a journalist when it refused to grant standing
for reports involving the real-life contract status of two professional wrestlers.
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involved in reporting because all of his information was given to him directly by
WCW employees.102 This investigation into reporting techniques, basing
privilege on a supposedly "good" journalistic style, ignores the critical question
of the von Bulow test. The von Bulow court wrote that "[t]he primary relationship
between the one seeking to invoke the privilege and his sources must have as its
basis the intent to disseminate the information to the public garnered from that
relationship."'103 Madden's relationship with WCW was that of an independent
contractor. However, the primary purpose of that relationship was to obtain
information from WCW executives to disseminate over the 1-900 hotline.'0 4
Madden's method of newsgathering should not be a factor in a supposedly
intent-based analysis.105 The First Amendment protects journalism that the
courts deem negligent, unethical, or just plain lousy.'0 6 For the court to express
disapproval of Madden's journalistic technique, under a test that demands no
such inquiry, shows bias against the subject of his reports.
102 See Madden, 151 F.3d at 130 ("He uncovered no story on his own nor did he
independently investigate any of the information given to him by WCW executives.").
103 von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 145 (2d Cir. 1987).
104 The von Bulow test raises an interesting question as to whether the journalist's
privilege applies to corporate spokespeople. Obviously, a corporate executive would not
qualify for the privilege when offering comments to the media. The test's language, however,
suggests that individuals employed solely as corporate spokespersons might have standing to
assert the privilege: 'The primary relationship between the one seeking to invoke the privilege
and his sources must have at its basis the intent to disseminate information to the public." Id.
While this result seems odd, it reinforces the "practical and conceptual difficulties" inherent in
a constitutional journalist's privilege. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 704 (1972).
Courts, and the public, however, can overcome some of these difficulties by thinking of the
privilege as qualified and not absolute. The balancing test of a qualified privilege will likely fix
many of the anomalous results.
105 Although superfluous to a von Bulow analysis, the fact that Madden uncovered no
stories of his own should be examined against the backdrop of the industry he covers. The only
sources for stories concerning professional wrestling are WCW and the WWF. Madden was
given reports by one of those groups, WCW, and by virtue of his status as a WCW hotline
correspondent was likely unable to contact sources within the WWF. It should be noted,
however, that Madden has been critical of WCW programming on his hotline commentaries.
106 See, e.g., Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 688
(1989) (stating that 'Tailure to investigate before publishing, even when a reasonably prudent
person would have done so" is not enough to overcome the constitutional protection of the
actual malice standard); Marshall & Gilles, supra note 95 at 170-71 (declaring that the
Supreme Court's First Amendment decisions have encouraged the development of
irresponsible journalism).
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4. Madden Mixed Entertainment with Journalism
The Third Circuit proclaimed that Madden, as an author of creative fiction,
primarily intended to entertain rather than to disseminate news or gather
information.107 The court found important Madden's admission that his reports
mixed entertainment with reporting.1 08 Clearly, Madden's reports had to
entertain as well as inform. To survive in an environment where people pay
$1.99 a minute to hear his reports, a dry commentary devoid of entertainment
would likely hinder repeat business and, in turn, Madden's livelihood. The fact
that Madden's opinions were at times outrageous or satirical should not change
an analysis under von Bulow.109 Journalism frequently includes a blend of
opinion and information; in fact the First Amendment comprehends such a
result.110 Von Bulow stands for the principle that the institutionalized press
should not have the sole right to claim the privilege because the informative
function of the press is also performed by, among others, dramatists and
novelists.111 Most plays and books strive to entertain as well as inform, and
many of those include outrageous social satire and criticism. If those authors
intend to disseminate information through their plays and books at the inception
of the information gathering process, the von Bulow test protects them. Madden
had that intent when he received materials from WCW.112 What separates
10 7 See Madden, 125 F.3d at 130.
10 8 See id. Madden testified that he tried to get people excited by including satire,
hyperbole, and humor in his reports. He further stated that WCW told him "to be a little crazy"
and entertain people with "offthe wall stuff." Id.
10 9 See von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 143 (2d Cir. 1987) ("[Tjhe critical
question in determining if a person falls within the class of persons protected by
the... privilege is whether the person, at the inception of the investigatory process, had the
intent to disseminate to the public the information obtained through the investigation.). The
von Bulow decision does not count as critical the means in which the reporter intends to convey
the information to the public. Furthermore, the First Amendment protects sensational
journalism as well as traditional journalism as evidenced by the fact that the National Enquirer
exists under the same rules as The New York Times. See, e.g., Eastwood v. National Enquirer,
123 F.3d 1249, 1251 (9th Cir. 1997) (applying actual malice standard to Enquirer report).
110 See Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444,452 (1938) ('The press... comprehends
every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion.).
IIl See von Bulow, 811 F.2d at 144-45 (citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 705
(1972).
1 1 2 The von Bulow test contemplates "the intent to use material--sought, gathered or
received--to disseminate information to the public." Id. at 144. 'qhe district court believed that
because Madden 'sought, gathered or received' materials from the WCW with the intention of
disseminating that material, he was a journalist." Madden, 151 F.3d at 130. The Third Circuit
required more, namely the investigation ofjudicially-approved news.
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Madden from the others is simply his subject matter and presentation.
5. Madden Did Not Intend to Disseminate News
The In re Madden opinion concludes its misapplication of the von Bulow test
by contending that even if Madden was gathering news, his claim of privilege
would still fail because, as an author of entertaining fiction, he lacked the intent
to disseminate that information. 113 Madden's primary purpose, according to the
court, was the creation of a work of art or entertainment. 114 This portion of the
opinion contradicts itself and ignores von Bulow while still claiming to adhere to
the test. The court never explains how Madden authored creative fiction, and
thereby lacked the intent to disseminate information, even as he received
information to disseminate from WCW executives. Furthermore, von Bulow
stated that the informative function of the press can be performed by those who
also entertain.1 15
In today's journalistic landscape, where the line between information and
entertainment is increasingly blurred, this portion of In re Madden is especially
troubling. The In re Madden court appears to read an entertainment element into
the von Bulow test and allows courts to selectively choose which vehicles of
information and opinion are worthy of protection. The opinion states that the
privilege should not be afforded to fiction or entertainment writers who have a
license with the facts that a traditional journalist lacks. 116 This portion of the
opinion, if relied upon in subsequent cases, may permit courts greater range in
passing judgment on the merits of a report.
V. THE IMPLICATIONS OF INRE MA4DDEN FOR THE NEW MEDIA
Thanks in large part to the intemet, a "punk kid" from Los Angeles can sit
next to William Safire on "Meet the Press."117 Increased competition for viewers
1 13 Seeln re Madden, 151 F.3d 125, 130(3dCir. 1998).
114 Seeid.
115 See von Bulow, 811 F.2d at 145 (stating that "[t]he informative function asserted by
representatives of the organized press... is also performed by lecturers, political pollsters,
novelists, academic researchers, and dramatists!") (quoting Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 705).
116 See Madden, 151 F.3d at 130 ('Fiction or entertainment writers are permitted to view
facts selectively, change the emphasis or chronology of events or even fill in factual gaps with
fictitious events-license ajournalist does not have.") (emphasis added).
117 See Sherry Ricchardi, Double Vision, AM. JOURNALISM REv. Apr. 1998, at 30, 32
(referring to the notion that Drudge would appear on "Meet the Press" as unthinkable); Frances
Katz, These 10 Sites are Among the Best of 1998, M iNNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL STAR TRmUNE.,
Dec. 29, 1998, at ElI (describing Matt Drudge as a punk kid whose Drudge Report made him
a must read).
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and readers has resulted in some pretty outlandish stunts by practitioners of the
new journalism. To attract attention to a debuting. program, one group of
journalists decided to broadcast an unsubstantiated report about nerve gas use in
Vietnam. 1 18 During the all-important sweeps period,119 one outrageous program
decided to broadcast a real-life physician-assisted suicide.120 This program later
trumped the suicide with excerpts from an exciting documentary on drug-
smuggling that was, unfortunately, a sham.121 How about that gossipy talking
head droning on about "blue dresses," "DNA evidence," and what the definition
of "is" is? Although the mainstream press would like to attribute these stories to
an amateur reporter with a new modem and a web browser, these examples of
journalism were foisted upon the American public by CNN, Time, and "60
Minutes," all bastions of traditional journalism.
The boundaries between traditional journalism and entertainment have
blurred.122 "Journalists regularly appear on Jay Leno and David Letterman, in
sitcoms... and in movies.... The result: a further dimming of distinctions
between public policy versus entertainment and traditional journalism versus
Hollywoodization .... - 123 The increased entertainment value of journalism can
be, at least in part, attributed to the fragmentation of the American media
consumer. In an era when viewers have a hundred channels and on-line access,
many feel that traditional journalism will fail to attract the public's attention. 124
The journalists may be right considering the decreased circulation and dwindling
ratings accompanying traditional journalism, as well as the increased influence
of nontraditional media outlets.125 While many point to programs such as Hard
1 18 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
119 Sweeps periods determine advertising rates for local television stations.
120 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
121 See id. at 21.
122 See Carl T. Bogus, The Death of an Honorable Profession, 71 IND. L.J. 911, 935
(1996) (discussing the increased blurring of the boundary between entertainment and news);
Lyle Denniston, From George Carlin to Matt Drudge: The Constitutional Implications of
Bringing the Paparazzi to America, 47 AM. U. L. REv. 1255, 1258 (1998) ('The press ... is
less and less able to distinguish between what is printed on the pages of the New York Times
and that which appears in the National Enquirer, or between what can be scanned at
washingtonpost.com and what is found at Matt Drudge's website, The Drudge Report.");
Ricchiardi, supra note 117, at 32 (describing the notion that politics and entertainment have
merged).
123 Ricchiardi, supra note 117, at 32.
124 See Gerald F. Uelmen, Leaks, Gags, and Shields: Taking Responsibility, 37 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 943, 958 (1997) ('Increasing costs and decreasing ratings have reportedly led
network news shows to adopt the lower standards of local news programs, which in turn are
pressured by the 'general Geraldoization' of television programming.').
125 See George F. Will, Washington Is Becoming Less Relevant to Public, COLumBUs
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Copy126 as an example of sensationalized news, the "legitimate" news programs
that view Hard Copy with disdain have adopted many of the tabloid genre's
techniques.1 2 7 The decline of substance is not a problem unique to television.
Many newspapers have become more outrageous to combat lost circulation and
increased competition.1 28
A. Applying the von Bulow Test After In re Madden
The merger of journalism and entertainment poses problems for the
journalist's privilege under an In re Madden analysis. Nontraditional journalists
face a lack of protection if they engage in the new journalism. However,
journalists associated with the institutional press will be allowed to claim the
privilege even if they mix entertainment with reporting. A court would grant
Matt Drudge's privilege claim if he worked for the New York Times. However,
because he reports on the intemet, In re Madden would permit discrimination
against Drudge's reporting style.
The In re Madden court stressed that "fiction or entertainment" writers have
a license with the facts that precludes status as a joumalist.1 29 Thus, under In re
Madden, courts become arbiters of what should be classified as entertainment or
as journalism. As already discussed, an emphasis on entertainment has invaded
the mainstream media's presentation of journalism. For instance, NBC
DIsPATCH, Jan. 3, 1999, at 3B (discussing the falling ratings for network television, local news
programs, and the drop in newspaper circulation from 63.1 million in 1984 to 56.7 million in
1997). While the approach of journalism to lagging consumption seems to be an increased
level of sensationalism, many critics contend that the public has abandoned traditional
journalism because of the increased sensational content. See Denniston, supra note 122, at
1255 ( In this era [of the Lewinski scandal], the press is nowhere near to meeting the levels of
propriety that large segments of the public tend to believe should be the absolute minimum.");
Ricchiardi, supra note 117, at 31 (discussing the public's dissatisfaction with the media's
coverage of the Monica Lewinski scandal).
126 Hard Copy is one of the most successful tabloid television news programs. In that
genre, "the outrageous is highly valued" Uelman, supra note 124, at 956.
127 See Bogus, supra note 122, at 935 ("NBC executive Reuven Frank has decreed that
every news story should 'display the attributes of fiction, of drama. It should have structure and
conflict, problem and denouement, rising action and falling action, a beginning, a middle and
an end."'); Uelmen, supra note 124, at 958 (discussing how tabloid stories become a part of the
mainstream media).
128 See Ricchiardi, supra note 117, at 32 (stating that a quarter century ago, "the New
York Post [sic] was a bastion of liberalisn, not Murdochism'"). Even the New York Times is not
immune from changing journalistic standards. See Bogus, supra note 122, at 936 (describing
that the average continuous quote or paraphrase from presidential candidates in the Times
dropped from fourteen lines in 1960 to six lines in 1992).
12 9 Seeln re Madden, 151 F.3d 125, 130 (3d Cir. 1998) (emphasis added).
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executives have recently declared that all news stories should resemble
fiction. 130 How should a court seeking to apply the von Bulow test, in light of In
re Madden, treat the merger ofjournalism and entertainment? Is NBC's primary
purpose to entertain or to disseminate news?
Clearly, an employee of NBC news will have standing to assert the
journalist's privilege. Evidence of employment by a news organization weighs
very heavily in a von Bulow analysis. 131 Regardless of the entertainment value of
traditional journalism, no court likely will find a sensationalized story on
"Dateline NBC"'132 so pervasively entertaining that it defeats even an In re
Madden analysis of von Bulow. However, because traditional and nontraditional
journalism have become so inseparable, the pedigree of working for a news
organization might make the difference that results in standing to assert the
journalist's privilege.133 Although the institutional press may be as entertaining
or irreverent as the nontraditional press, the In re Madden analysis could exclude
nontraditional journalists from protection. This situation, of course, counters the
principle of von Bulow that intent, rather than experience as a journalist,
determines standing.134
1, Applying In re Madden to Matt Drudge
A hypothetical application of the In re Madden reasoning to an individual
like Matt Drudge demonstrates the problem with this way of viewing von Bulow.
If Drudge, or one of his cohorts in the new media, tried to assert the privilege, an
unsympathetic judge could strike a claim of privilege even if the intent to
disseminate information was present at the inception of newsgathering. Without
the pedigree or attachment to an institutionalized news organization, the lone
130 See Bogus, supra note 122, at 935.
131 See von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 144 ("[Pjrior experience as a
professional journalist may be persuasive evidence of present intent to gather for the purpose of
dissemination ... ").
132 A Dateline NBC telecast secretly rigged a GMC truck's crash test with remote
controlled explosives. This incident led to the resignation of reporters, producers, and the
president of NBC News. See Thomas D. Yannucci, Debunking the "Big Chill"--7y
Defamation Suits by Corporations are Consistent with the First Amendment, 39 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 1187, 1200-01 (1995).
133 In an unpublished decision, the D.C. district court granted the journalist's privilege to
a former Clinton aide called as a witness in the "filegate" controversy. Applying the von Bulow
test, the court granted standing to claim the journalist's privilege in part based on the aide's
employment with ABC News. The employment in a journalistic capacity included regular
appearances as a commentator and news analyst. See Alexander v. FBI, 186 F.R.D. 21, 50
(D.D.C. 1998).
134 See von Bulow, 811 F.2d at 144.
1612 [Vol. 60:1589
THE NEW JOURNVALISM
pamphleteer of the cyber age could lose the protection afforded the legitimate-
albeit equally sensationalized-press. The In re Madden decision threatens those
who practice the new journalism only if they do not belong to the institutional
press.
a. Drudge Is Not Gathering News
Traditional journalists often refer to Matt Drudge as a "cybergossip."'1 35
Many have claimed that he is in the business of spreading rumors, not
documented facts.136 One court has already commented on Drudge's journalistic
merit in a personal jurisdiction context, and the results were not favorable to any
future claim of journalist's privilege.' 37 A court applying von Bulow could just
as easily say that Drudge does not gather news, but merely spreads gossip or
innuendo. At least one court reached this conclusion, even after Drudge broke
the story that eventually led to the impeachment of a President.138 Thanks to In
re Madden, a court can make this conclusion, and deny Drudge standing to claim
the journalist's privilege, even though he gathers information with the sole
purpose of dissemination over his website. Furthermore, a court can conclude
this even though traditional journalists cover the exact same stories and
anxiously read Drudge's column. 139 Drudge lacks the pedigree of a journalist,
however, so his claim of privilege might very well fail. Ajudicial inquiry into the
validity of what should or should not be news violates First Amendment
principles, 140 brings to fruition the Branzburg plurality's fear of content-based
discrimination,141 and infringes upon the rights of "lonely pamphleteer[s]" given
much greater power thanks to the intemet.142
135 See Godwin, supra note 2, at 757 (saying that Drudge likes to gossip).
136 See Denniston, supra note 122, at 1258 n.14 (citing Matt Bai, Whispers on the Web:
The Gossipy Matt Drudge Roils the Media Elite, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 18, 1997, at 69, 69)
(discussing Drudge's less-than-discriminating reporting style).
137 See Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44,57 n.18 (D.D.C. 1998) ('Drudge is not a
reporter, a journalist or a newsgatherer. He is, as he himself admits, simply a purveyor of
gossip. His argument that he should benefit from the 'news gathering exception' to the long-
arm statute merits no serious consideration.") (citation omitted).
138 See id; see also supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing Drudge's influence
and accuracy in the wake of the Lewinski scandal).
139 See Titans of 'tude, supra note 1, at 32 (naming Drudge one of the 20 media stars of
the new journalism and a must read in political circles).
140 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 705 n.40 (1972) (stating that the First
Amendment ordinarily prohibits inquiry into the content of speech).
141 See id.
142 See id. at 704.
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b. Drudge Mixes Entertainment with Reporting
As already discussed, the mainstream media mixes entertainment with
journalism on a routine basis. 143 A court applying In re Madden to Drudge,
however, could assert that because his reports frequently focus on salacious or
titillating details, Drudge's mingling of gossip-based entertainment with
journalism denies him standing to assert the journalist's privilege. Just as the In
re Madden opinion characterizes Madden as a disseminator of hype specializing
in hyperbole and satire,144 a future court could declare Drudge a disseminator of
gossip specializing in hyperbole and titillation. Since Drudge's reports have no
basis in the news, and his sometimes seamy reports frequently include humor
and satire, a court could declare Drudge's reports to be entertainment rather than
journalism. Once again, this could happen if a court ignores the very premise of
the von Bulow test, the newsgatherer's intent, and focuses on In re Madden's
misapplication of the test. The traditional media's coverage of the Lewinski
matter has proven no better, or no less salacious, than Drudge's reporting,145 but
the traditional media bears the journalist's privilege "stamp of approval"-
employment and experience in the professional media.
c. Drudge Does Not Intend to Disseminate News
The In re Madden logic (i.e. that an entertainment writer has license with the
facts that a "true" newsperson lacks) could deny Drudge standing. As In re
Madden implied, an intent to create a piece of entertainment or art precludes an
intent to create news. 146 Thus, a court could imply that Drudge intends
something other than the dissemination of news. This line of reasoning poses the
greatest threat to practitioners of the new journalism. Courts would be free to
apply any purpose to a newsgatherer, regardless of the intent to disseminate
information, based upon the content and form of dissemination.
How can a court balance the implied intent of entertainment with the actual
intent of supplying information to the public? Can novice reporters, explicitly
protected in von Bulow,147 adequately show that entertainment was not their
purpose? Obviously, anyone attempting to report news to the public wants as
many people as possible to consume the information they provide. The multi-
143 See supra notes 86-101 and accompanying text (discussing the merger of
entertainment and journalism).
144 See In re Madden, 151 F.3d 125, 130 (3d Cir. 1998).
145 See supra note 3.
146 See Madden, 151 F.3d at 130.
147 See von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 144 (2d Cir. 1987) ('The burden indeed
may be sustained by one who is a novice in the field.").
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million dollar salaries of network anchors demonstrate this fact. However, a
novice reporter with a website and a modem lacks the billion dollar budgets the
traditional press relies upon. Novice reporters, to counteract the huge differences
in influence, will try different techniques to get themselves noticed. Like Drudge,
they may specialize in "inside the beltway" gossip. They may interweave their
stories with social satire and outrageous humor. But traditional reporting, the
likes of which can be found on the evening news, will not gain any consumers if
done by some "punk kid" on the intemet.148 The evening news has more money,
more resources, and can be sought out with minimal effort. To gain attention,
new journalists need to offer a fresh spin on the news, be it through
entertainment or an outrageously new perspective. 149
In re Madden could deny protection to those individuals who by necessity
resort to an unorthodox reporting style. Your site is humorous? Okay, you intend
to entertain. Your report contains gossip? Okay, you intend to spread rumors.
Under In re Madden, the actual intent at the inception of the newsgathering
process plays second fiddle to the presumed intent of the report based upon
content and presentation. If the court does not approve of the report's style and
subject, the individual faces compelled disclosure. The von Bulow test offers
little protection if the outcome can ignore the fact that an individual 'sought
gathered or received information' ... with the intention of disseminating that
material" and not meet the threshold.150
B. The Need to Protect the New Journalism
Matt Drudge has influenced journalists and politicians of all statures,
including the President of the United States. 151 Drudge was named in a thirty
million dollar libel suit by White House employee Sydney Blumenthal. 152
Clearly, a lone individual with a modem, a website, and a new style of
joumalism can make powerful and influential enemies. This truth, and the need
for the protection of the journalist's privilege, can be found in the events leading
to the Blumenthal libel case. After posting the defamatory statements on his
148 See supra note 117.
149 See generally Titans of "tude, supra note 1.
150 Madden, 151 F.3d at 130 (stressing that even though the district court found that
Madden sought, gathered, and obtained information from WCW with the intent to distribute
that information to the public, more was required to qualify for thejournalist's privilege).
151 See Titans of "tude, supra note 1, at 32 (stating that, according to the Starr report,
President Clinton calls Drudge "Sludge").
152 See Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44,48 (D.D.C. 1998). For a discussion of the
constitutional issues behind the libel case, see Godwin, supra note 2, at 758-61.
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website,153 Drudge received a harshly worded letter from Blumenthal's lawyer
demanding a retraction.154 The letter also included a demand that Drudge
disclose the sources for his story.155 While not court-ordered disclosure, this
action demonstrates the threat posed to small practitioners of the new journalism.
If the journalist's privilege does not apply to such practitioners, powerful
corporations, politicians, and public figures with the means to finance lawsuits
can harass novice reporters out of business.156
Nontraditional journalists contribute to the diversity of expression
envisioned by the First Amendment. The Supreme Court has written: "That
Amendment rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of
information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of
the public.... Freedom to publish means freedom for all and not for some."157
The importance of nontraditional journalists cannot be understated in today's era
of media consolidation. According to the Court, "[i]n light of the 'increasingly
prominent role of the mass media in our society, and the awesome power it has
placed in the hands of a select few,' protection for the speech of nonmedia
defendants is essential to ensure a diversity of perspectives." 158 The intemet has
granted nontraditional journalists immense power at a pivotal time in our
nation's history. To allow those journalists to be run out of business, just as the
institutional media grows more powerful, would run afoul of the First
Amendment's expectation of a diversity of ideas.
VI EXTENDING PROTECTION TO NONTRADiTIONAL JouRNALISTS: BEYOND
THE VONBULOWTEST
The Supreme Court's Branzburg fears have come to fruition. Even though
members of the traditional press cling to their status as respected journalists, the
153 Drudge reported a rumor that "GOP operatives inside the Beltway think they've got a
trump card in dealing with this guy Blumenthal because (they said) he has a history of spousal
abuse and there are court records that show that he has this history." Godwin, supra note 2, at
758. No court records existed, however, and Blumenthal has no such history. See id.
154 See id. at 759.
155 See id.
15 6 See Paul Allee Curtis, New Limits on Freedom of the Press: Newsperson's Qualified
Privilege Fails to Protect Nonconfidential Video Tape Outtakes-State v. Salsbury, 34 IDAHO
L. REV. 191, 210 n.136 (1997) ("While large media organizations with the resources to fight
subpoenas may be less susceptible to deterrence, smaller organizations with fewer resources
are likely to think twice about obtaining information which may be subject to subpoenas and
the high costs of litigation.").
157 Associated Press v. United States Tribune, Co., 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
158 Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 783 n.9 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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realities of tabloid culture demonstrate that the reports of Matt Drudge often
mirror those of the established press.159 Because the Supreme Court has
repeatedly ruled against special constitutional protection for the institutionalized
press,160 courts faced with questions of standing in a journalist's privilege
context have two choices: abandon the journalist's privilege as the Branzburg
plurality advised 161 or adopt a broad, functional definition of the press. 162
15 9 See Daniel Schorr, New Journalism, the Old Manipulation, DES MorNEs REGISTER,
Feb. 5, 1999, at 11 ("Economic consolidation has put television networks into the hands of
conglomerates less interested in news as a mission than as a product in the marketplace.
Competition, the remorseless hunt for ratings, has promoted sex, violence and a preference for
the titillating over the illuminating.").
160 See Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 668 (1990) (stating
that "the press' unique societal role may not entitle the press to greater protection under the
Constitution," but may provide a reason to exempt media corporations from the scope of
political expenditure limitations); id. at 691 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ('We have consistently
rejected the proposition that the institutionalized press has any constitutional privilege beyond
that of other speakers."); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Belotti, 435 U.S. 765, 781-82 (1978)
("The press cases emphasize the special and constitutionally recognized role of that institution
in informing and educating the public, offering criticism, and providing a forum for discussion
and debate. But the press does not have a monopoly on either the First Amendment or the
ability to enlighten") (citations omitted); id. at 802 (Burger CJ., concurring) (finding 'no
difference between the right of those who seek to disseminate ideas by way of a newspaper and
those who give lectures or speeches" because "the First Amendment does not 'belong' to any
definable category of persons or entities" but to "all who exercise its freedoms"); Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 704 (1972) ("Freedom of the press is a 'fundamental personal right'
which is not confined to newspapers and periodicals."); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444,
452 (1938) ('The press in its historic connotation comprehends every sort of publication which
affords a vehicle of information and opinion."); see also Yin, supra note 30, at 334 (noting the
equality the Supreme Court has read into the Press Clause because the Court "refused to make
the institutional press stronger than the non-institutional press").
161 408 U.S. at 704-705 (declining to find a journalist's privilege, in part, because of the
difficulties of defining the press in light of the scope of freedom of the press).
162 See Lidsky, supra note 33, at 230 ('The emergence of new technologies further
complicates the problem of choosing between an institutional definition of the press and a
functional definition. These new technologies make each citizen capable of becoming the
'lonely pamphleteer' that the First Amendment is designed to protect."). At least two scholars
have called for a strict institutional definition of the press. See Leslye DeRoos & Ann K.
Grossman, The Case for a Federal Journalist's Testimonial Shield Statute, 18 HASTINGS
CoNsT. L.Q. 779, 802-06 (1991) ("Under the model statute, only persons who
are.., employed by or connected with the institutional press can invoke the privilege."). An
institutionalized definition ignores the constitutional precedent of a broad definition of freedom
of the press as established by the Supreme Court. See supra note 91-94. Furthermore, such a
definition, while seeking to recognize the legitimate media, ignores the increased
sensationalism of traditional joumalism. The privilege would apply to NBC news stories
accentuating elements of fiction and drama, see supra note 127, but deny standing to the
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A. A Level Playing Field
If the courts refuse to grant standing to nontraditional journalists, justice
would be better served by abandoning the journalist's privilege. Media
consolidation places incredible influence in the hands of a few large
conglomerates. 163 Among these media conglomerates, "silent routines ... keep
the subject of self-coverage generally quiescent among writers and reporters
without direct managerial involvement." 164 As a result journalistic freedom to
report on issues vital to the interests of parent companies may lie outside the
sphere of traditional journalism.
In 1995, media mergers grew to a record 243.165 Courts would not serve the
interests of the First Amendment by granting a journalist's privilege solely to the
institutionalized press.166 Especially in a time of media consolidation,
nontraditional journalists have the ability to enhance the "paramount public
interest in the maintenance of a vigorous, aggressive and independent press
capable of participating in robust, unfettered debate over controversial matters,
an interest which has always been a principal concern of the First
Amendment. '167 For instance, nontraditional journalists can, without fear of
reprisal, investigate the defense contract of the parent corporation of a major
traditional reporting of a freelance journalist on the internet. Such a distinction should have no
basis in constitutional law or in the world of sensationalized media.
163 See Clay Calvert, The Reporter's Privilege v. the Corporate-Interest Muzzle: Philip
Morris Co., Inc. v. ABC, Inc., 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1, 17-22 (1996) (discussing the negative
impact media conglomeration has on investigative reporting).
164 Joseph Turow, Hidden Conflicts and Journalistic Norms: The Case of Self Coverage,
J. COMM., Spring 1994, at 29,30.
165 See Calvert, supra note 163, at 21.
166 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 727 (1972) (Stewart, ., dissenting). The
Branzburg dissent discussed the importance of maintaining an independent press:
As private and public aggregations of power burgeon in size and the pressures
for conformity necessarily mount; there is obviously a continuing need for an
independent press to disseminate a robust variety of information and opinion
through reportage, investigation, and criticism if we are to preserve our
constitutional tradition of maximizing freedom of choice by encouraging
diversity of expression.
Id.
The consolidation of the media hampers diversity of expression and freedom of choice.
Independent practitioners of the new journalism, however, can report a wide variety of stories
and opinions without risking a parent corporation's rebuke.
167 von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 144 (2d Cir. 1987) (quoting Baker v. F & F
Inv., 470 F.2d 778,782 (1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966,966 (1973).
1618 [Vol. 60:1589
THE NEWJOURNALISM
media outlet. Perhaps such an assertion sounds farfetched, but who could have
imagined that gossip floating on the internet would lead to the President's
impeachment? Nontraditional journalists should have the same playing field and
protection as the institutionalized press.168 If one group is denied standing, the
First Amendment would be best served by eliminating the privilege so that all
media outlets, traditional or nontraditional, could compete for access on the same
playing field.
B. An Expanded Functional Definition of the Press
Courts and scholars have embraced the qualified journalist's privilege. This
Comment does not advocate the elimination of the privilege.169 Rather, this
Comment endorses a broad, functional definition of the press that expands upon
von Bulow and gives the heightened protection to nontraditional journalists that
von Bulow alone may not be able to provide. Under this functional definition, the
elements required to assert the journalist's privilege include: (1) any person who
reports on a subject that is a matter of interest to a significant segment of the
community; 170 (2) and intends to disseminate information relating to that subject
before receiving it 171 (3) by "every sort of'publication which affords a vehicle of
information and opinion;"'172 (4) including publications that employ entertaining
devices such as humor, satire, sarcasm, or elements of fiction. 173 This definition
attempts to broaden von Bulow in response to a potential In re Madden analysis
that should raise concerns for practitioners of the new journalism.
1681Te standard rationale of the journalist's privilege, "[tlhe deterrent effect such
disclosure is likely to have upon future 'undercover' investigative reporting," applies strongly
to a situation where only the institutionalized press has standing to assert the privilege. Id. at
142-43. An informant armed with the knowledge that his tips are privileged only if given to
the traditional press will likely forego all contacts with nontraditional journalists. As a result,
the marketplace for the new journalism will dry up as most potential scoops will be funneled
through traditional media outlets. Such a result would severely hamper the diversity of
expression the First Amendment intends.
169 The previous discussion merely attempts to illustrate that eliminating the privilege, as
the Branzburg plurality advocated, would be preferable to a system that embraces an
institutionalized definition of the press.
170 See supra notes 91-105 and accompanying text (discussing the constitutional
prohibition of content-based discrimination in relation to In re Madden).
171 See infra note 176 (discussing the intent needed to trigger First Amendment
protections for newsgathering).
172 Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444,452 (1938).
173 See supra notes 116-27 and accompanying text (discussing the merger of
entertainment and information in today's journalistic landscape).
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Madden was criticized for gathering something other than news.174 The
proposed functional definition reads the word "news" out of any analysis and
disallows a court from offering its own interpretation as to what news should be.
Furthermore, the threshold test's first element addresses the "practical and
conceptual difficulties" of a journalist's privilege that concerned the Branzburg
plurality.1 75 Like the von Bulow test, the new test eschews any institutional
definition of journalism and recognizes that freedom of the press is a
"fundamental personal right" not confined to the institutionalized press. 1 76
Because von Bulow correctly stated that the journalist's intent triggers First
Amendment protection,177 the proposed test maintains an intent element
Furthermore, the test embraces the Supreme Court's broad interpretation of the
Press Clause by formally disregarding the means employed to disseminate
information.178
174 See In re Madden, 151 F.3d 125, 130 (3d Cir. 1998) ("Mr. Madden was not
investigating 'news,' even were we to apply a generous definition of the word.").
175 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,704 (1972).
176 See id. at 704. The von Bulow opinion crafted the intent-based test in response to the
Branzburg plurality's broad reading of the Press Clause. See von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811
F.2d 136, 144-45 (2d Cir. 1987) (quoting Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 705) ("[Tjhe protection from
disclosure may be sought by one not traditionally associated with the institutionalized press
because '[t]he informative function asserted by representatives of the organized press ... is also
performed by [those not associated with the organized press].").
177 Although the Branzburg plurality ruled against the journalist's privilege, the opinion
conceded that "news gathering is not without its First Amendment protections." Branzburg,
408 U.S. at 707. Justice Powell's concurrence, as well as the dissent, also found First
Amendment protections for newsgathering. See id. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring) (stating that
newsmen are not without "constitutional rights with respect to the gathering of news"); id. at
727 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("A corollary of the right to publish must be the right to gather
news.'). Because the Court agreed that the First Amendment, to some degree, protected
newsgathering, the intent to gather news must be present for one to properly claim the
privilege. The First Amendment "provides no basis for claiming a journalist's privilege by
persons who do not begin their investigations with an intent to disseminate information to the
public, since no First Amendment rights are implicated under such circumstances." von Bulow,
811 F.2d at 143. "A person who gathers information for personal reasons, unrelated to
dissemination of information to the public, will not be deterred from undertaking his
search.. ." because of the threat of compelled disclosure. Id. As a result, even professional
journalists could not assert the privilege if they obtained information in a private, non-
journalistic capacity. The joumalist's state of mind, and not the source of their paycheck,
determines standing to assert the privilege.
178 Under this test, Mark Madden would qualify as a journalist. See Madden, 151 F.3d
129-30. He intended to report information on professional wrestling, a matter of public
interest, before receiving that information from WCW employees. The proposed test prohibits
a court from infering an intent other than the intent to disseminate news even though a report
may be entertaining. As a result, Madden's use of humor and sarcasm could not be used to
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C. Applying the Test
A hypothetical application of the test to a reporter like Matt Drudge
demonstrates how the test comports with changing journalistic practices,
expanding technology, and Supreme Court precedent.
1. Drudge Intends to Disseminate Information over the Internet
Drudge easily satisfies two prongs of the expanded functional test. First,
Drudge intends to disseminate information before he receives it. He does not
gather information for personal reasons unrelated to public dissemination.
Rather, Drudge intends to post his reports on his internet site. Second, Drudge's
internet site qualifies as a publication of opinion and information.
2. Drudge Reports on Matters ofInterest
While most journalists and at least one federal court prefer not to label
Drudge's reports "news," 179 his enormous success attests to the fact that his
subject matter interests the public.' 80 Courts may not like the salacious style or
tone of his reports, but courts cannot inquire into the content of his expression. 181
show that he intended to entertain or create a work of art.
179 See Nightline (ABC television broadcast, Jan. 8, 1998) (discussing Newsweekreporter
Michael Isikoff's claim that Drudge engages in water cooler talk, not real reporting, and that he
has "poisoned that atmosphere for real reporting"); see also Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F.
Supp. 44, 57 n.18 (D.D.C. 1998) (calling Drudge a gossip and not a news reporter).
180 'Me proposed test does not include a public interest requirement. Rather, a report must
be of interest to a significant segment of the community. This language broadly encompasses
small circulation private newsletters such as employee or community newsletters. See Baker,
supra note 12, at 756-60 (stating that editors of such newsletters should have standing to assert
the joumalist's privilege). While the public at large may not be concerned with matters of
relevance to employees of a particular corporation, a significant group inside the corporation
depends upon news about their career opportunities, benefits, and corporate health. "Employee
newsletters maintain employee morale and lead to increased productivity." Id. at 759. Reports
that target significant groups, such as employees or club members, trigger the concerns and
protections implicit with newsgathering even if the public at large claims no interest. Freedom
of the press is a personal right that applies to individuals regardless of the size of their
operation. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 704. A significant segment of the community can
include just about any definable group, regardless of size.
181 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 705 nA0. However, because the Court has found that
newsgathering receives some First Amendment protections, courts must necessarily determine
whether expression implicates newsgathering concerns. Speech otherwise protected by the
First Amendment may not involve gathering news under the Press Clause. The proposed test
attempts to formalize those situations where expression does not require newsgathering
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The primary concern for practitioners of the new journalism is that courts will
determine that what they are reporting is not news, even if their reports mirror
the style of the institutional press. Drudge's reports contain information about
public figures and public events, both matters which concern the public. As a
result he would have standing to assert the privilege.
3. Drudge Intends to Report News
Drudge's reports tend toward the titillating or salacious side. Clearly, his
reports are crafted with entertainment in mind. However, the proposed test
clearly states that publications that employ entertaining devices such as humor,
satire, sarcasm, or elements of fiction warrant protection. A court would not be
free to infer another intention, rather than the intent to disseminate information,
simply because the report added elements of entertainment. This element
protects those journalists who, because of insufficient funds, resort to unorthodox
means of publishing news. Again, Drudge would have standing to assert the
privilege.
VII. CONCLUSION
The von Bulow test accurately perceived the First Amendment concerns
raised by the journalist's privilege. A court must be aware of the broad
connotation of the press as well as the intent necessary to implicate protections
for newsgathering. However, the seemingly innocuous phrasing of von Bulow
invites the very content-based discrimination the Court feared in deciding
Branzburg. The Branzburg plurality did not want "to embark the judiciary on a
long and difficult journey to such an uncertain destination."'182 However, the
federal courts went anyway. In examining the privilege nearly thirty years after
Branzburg, an ominous trend could develop among those courts to weaken
freedom of the press for the computer-age "lonely pamphleteer." 183 If courts
continue to tread where the Supreme Court feared to go, a broad functional
protection. Newspapers designed to shield criminal activity do not implicate Press Clause
concerns. One type of expression that should not implicate newsgathering protection involves
matter that is not of interest to a significant segment of the community. Although conceptually
difficult to comprehend, courts should view this information in a manner analogous to the
public figure or matter of public concern dichotomy that comprises constitutional defamation
law. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 759 (1985)
("[S]peech on matters of purely private concern is of less First Amendment concern.) A report
that does not implicate a matter of concern to a significant segment of the community,
regardless of size, should not trigger newsgathering protections.
182 Branzburg, 408 U.S, at 703.
183 See id. at 704 (stating that freedom of the press applies to the lone pamphleteer).
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definition of the press must be utilized to preserve the "fundamental personal
right" of freedom of the press.' 84 Otherwise, media consolidation could lead to a
vacuum filled by only a few voices, the Framers of the First Amendment
envisioned as filled by many.
18 4 See id.
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